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coercion, n. “1. a. Constraint, restraint, compulsion; the application of
force to control the action of a voluntary agent . . .b. Forcible restraint of
(action) . . . 2. Government by force, as opposed to that which rests upon the
will of the community governed.”
conﬂict, n. “1. a. An encounter with arms; a ﬁght, battle . . . b. esp. A prolonged
struggle . . . c. (without article or pl.) Fighting, contending with arms, martial
strife.”1
The study of economics begins with trade.2 In an idealized market, sellers
compete with each other for buyers. Under the rules of the market,
competition is impersonal and non-violent. Each person makes their best
choice, which can include staying out of the market; no one is forced to take
part. As Adam Smith (1776/2005: 364) suggested, a result of the sellers’
pursuit of their own private proﬁt is that resources are “led by an invisible
hand” towards their best uses. In turn, the buyers’ pursuit of their own
greatest satisfaction ensures that everyone gains who takes part willingly.
In the outcome, the well-being of society is raised.
This model was ﬁrst developed when England was still an agrarian
society and is simpliﬁed in the extreme, yet it explains much of modern
prosperity.
The world of coercion and conﬂict is, at ﬁrst sight, utterly diﬀerent.
In this world “every man is enemy to every man . . . and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1651/1909: 96–97). Each
person’s behaviour is limited not by rules but only by their own conscience
1OED Online (June 2013). Oxford University Press. http://0-www.oed.com.pugwash.
lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/Entry/35725 and http://0-www.oed.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.
ac.uk/view/Entry/38898 (accessed 27 August 2013).
2I thank David Hugh Jones and Peter Law for thoughtful comments and advice.
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or, in its absence, by greed and fear. The immediate casualties are other
people. In the longer term wealth is destroyed and society is impoverished.
Even if a few lords or warlords retain a proﬁt, there is never enough left
over to compensate the losers.
Thus there are two worlds, one of free markets, industriousness, and
enjoyment. The other is the world of tyrants, soldiers, slaves, and the
lash. The gap between them is apparently unbridgeable. It turns out,
however, that among the tools we have developed to analyze markets and
corporations are some that can readily be turned to understand war and
repression.
I am not the ﬁrst to try to list these concepts and tools, and
explain their application. Economists, historians, and political scientists
have recently contributed excellent applied and theoretical studies of the
political economy of dictatorship and coercion (Wintrobe, 2000; Gregory,
2001; Gregory and Lazarev, 2003; Dixit, 2004; Gregory, 2004; 2009). Others
have done the same for interstate conﬂict (Oﬀer, 1989: 7–20; Fearon, 1995;
Bueno de Mesquita, 2006, Brauer and van Tuyll, 2008: 1–44, Smith, 2009:
19–53; Rockoﬀ, 2012: 13–47; Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2012; Findlay and
O’Rourke, 2012).
If there is novelty in this chapter, it stems from examining coercion
and conﬂict in the same framework. This is appropriate because the two
are organically connected.
Adversaries, Coercion, and Conﬂict
To understand how coercion and conﬂict are connected, we need some
deﬁnitions. What is conﬂict? There is a potential for conﬂict whenever two
persons disagree, for example, about how to use or dispose of a resource.
Resources can be of any kind — physical, ﬁnancial, political, or emotional.
Many such disagreements do not amount to conﬂict; they are ﬂeeting, and
are resolved quickly through compromise, so that they do not end in “an
encounter with arms” as the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) puts it
(cited above). Such readiness to compromise requires mutual recognition of
the entitlements of the parties in disagreement, including the right not to
agree. The fact that a particular dispute persists over a considerable period
of time, however, is usually a signal that it is not of this transient and
harmless nature; the parties cannot agree to each other’s right to disagree.
They become adversaries in a “prolonged struggle” — one of the alternative
meanings that the OED gives to conﬂict.
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If unresolved disagreement over entitlements lies at the root of conﬂict,
how is conﬂict resolved? Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2012) deﬁne conﬂict by
the presence of “adversarial investments”, required for the “threat or use
of coercive means.” In the words of the OED conﬂict is inherently violent:
adversaries engage in “ﬁghting, contending with arms, martial strife.” Here,
economists go further: violence is a possible correlate of conﬂict, but it is
not necessary, because expectations matter: the threat of violence can be
suﬃcient, provided it is backed by costly investments in “coercive means”
(i.e. it is more than just cheap talk). In the presence of threats, conﬂict
among adversaries can be worked out under duress, but without violence,
through negotiation or bargaining.
What is coercion? When I coerce you, I impose my choice on yours.
As the OED puts it, it is “the application of force to control the action of
a voluntary agent.” But the agent is still voluntary, and coercion does not
deprive the agent of all choice. Rather, coercion means I force you to choose
between the alternatives as I have deﬁned them, not as you would see them.
Moreover, each of the alternatives I allow you is inferior to the entitlement
you have or seek. A highwayman points a gun at you and demands: “Your
money or your life!” That is coercion. Within it, you have a choice: you’re
free to choose whether to give me your wallet or die at my hand. The signal
of coercion is that you cannot walk away and keep what you had. Whatever
you choose, you will end up worse oﬀ than you were before. Thus, when I
coerce you, it is intrinsic to the situation that you lose something to which
you believe you were previously entitled.
(And, because entitlements rest ultimately on beliefs, conﬂicts over
entitlement are always perceived asymmetrically. I stand up for my rights;
you’re unreasonable.)
To summarize, coercion can be distinguished from free exchange, but
the diﬀerence does not lie where many would naturally assume, in the
victim’s absence of choice. The diﬀerence is that, when you and I trade
freely, you do not suﬀer any loss of entitlement. Either the choices available
to you through trade leave us both better oﬀ, or you can remain no worse
oﬀ by choosing not to trade. Coercion diﬀers from trade not in removal of
the victim’s choice, but in the restriction of choice to a set of options that
is strictly inferior to those available beforehand.
Coercion is often linked to repression, but the two are not the
same. When I coerce you, I leave you worse oﬀ. When I repress you,
I prevent you from signaling your protest — your dissatisfaction with
the outcome. Repression can be political, but it can also be economic or
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ﬁnancial. Applied to political markets, repression means the silencing of
discontent. Economic and ﬁnancial repression refers to the administrative
controls that conceal market stress, which would otherwise be signaled by
rising prices or interest rates. Such controls include price and interest caps
and allocation by rationing and licensing.
Conﬂict, coercion, and repression have in common the exercise of force.
Force requires “adversarial investments” and so is costly to produce and
use. This is what makes them all negative-sum activities — as distinct
from trade, which gives rise to a positive sum. After I have forced you to
do what you would not have chosen to do willingly, our joint wealth is less
than it was before. My power allows me to gain, only by imposing a loss on
you. If you resist, and I impose my power on you by force or threats, our
joint wealth is diminished, and the smallest loss I must impose on you in
order to gain myself must be larger by that amount.
Just as conﬂict does not have to end in violence, coercion need not
be violent either, but there is generally violence when coercion is resisted.
It could be that you refuse the inferior choice set that I oﬀer you (“Your
money or your life”). This suggests that my power appeared inadequate at
ﬁrst, and required some demonstration or reinforcement. Or, conﬂict arises
as a prelude to coercion, if I attack you (or you attack me) preemptively,
to demonstrate superior coercive means. In other words, violence expresses
actual or potential resistance to coercion and is therefore linked to the scope
for coercion to fail.
In what I have written so far, coercion is never productive. That
perspective is perhaps too narrow, or rather it accurately reﬂects a bias
in my research. To explain further, in the example of the highwayman,
coercion was used to steal your property, and this could be thought of as
destructive not only of your personal entitlement but also of the general
system of property rights. A system of property rights that can be enforced
within the law is generally recognized as one of the hallmarks of a well-
ordered society. In that case, it would seem a good idea for the public to
apply some coercion to the highwayman. With the right combination of
stick and carrot, a reformed highwayman might even gain in the long run.
Then, coercion would be productive of a social beneﬁt.3
3In a similar spirit Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2012) limit their deﬁnition of conﬂict
to exclude those investments in adversarial means that bring external beneﬁts to third
parties. They intend this to exclude from the sphere of conﬂict the competitive tourna-
ments and sporting events that raise productivity or provide enjoyment. Investments in
policing under the rule of law also provide external beneﬁts to third parties and on the
same logic they should also be excluded from our deﬁnition of conﬂict.
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In a well-ordered society, coercion enforces the law, but it is also
restrained by the law. Here, law enforcement and legal restraint are two
sides of the same coin. One importance of legal restraint is to underpin the
community’s consent to the laws that are enforced. It is diﬀerent in the other
sort of society, the sort that is not “well-ordered.” There, coercion enforces
the will of the government, not the rule of law. In that case government is,
as the OED puts it, “by force, as opposed to that which rests upon the will
of the community governed.”
Law enforcement and public coercion subject to the law are very
important subjects for history and social science. On the whole, however,
my research has addressed other aspects of public coercion, those that have
lent support to arbitrary power including the unrestrained enforcement
of arbitrary laws, when the government is relatively unconcerned about
personal freedoms and private entitlements and does not answer to the
courts, the electorate, or anyone but itself. In the cases that I have studied,
coercion was generally associated with repression, because the government
did not regard the victims of coercion as entitled to any legal redress or
legitimate expression of protest.
The chapters in this book are mainly about conﬂict and coercion that
is organized among states and groups. The state is present in every chapter,
sometimes as the body that seeks to monopolize violence over its subjects,
sometimes as the main source of violence within global society.
In the long run of human history the monopolization of lawful violence
by the state has been one factor in the great diminution of interpersonal
violence in the world since early times (Gat, 2006; Pinker, 2011; North
et al., 2011). But “lawful violence” must be understood carefully; it implies
that alongside the state’s monopolization of violence come acceptance
of the rule of law, including private property rights and other rights of
the citizens vis a` vis the state. A problem here is that the source of
these laws is the sovereign state and the source of international law is
agreement among sovereigns. All sovereigns are subject to the Weingast
(1995: 1) paradox: “A government strong enough to protect property rights
and enforce contracts is also strong enough to conﬁscate the wealth of
its citizens.” On the same reasoning, a state that is powerful enough to
monopolize violence is also powerful enough to exercise it without restraint
against its own citizens and against other states.
If public coercion and conﬂict among states are so closely related in
theory, the connection should be reﬂected in the facts. And it is: empirically,
as discussed in Chapter 4, coercion and conﬂict often arise together because
coercive political regimes are very often sources of conﬂict among states.
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Before the modern era, virtually all states were authoritarian and
warfare was the main function of the nation state. In European history,
as Charles Tilly (1975: 42) observed, “War made the state and states made
war.” This relationship between the nation state and warfare began to break
down only as governments became democratic, and acquired additional
functions, and at the same time the rule of law took the place of rule
by men.
There are many reasons why states based on the rule of law (Kant,
1795/1983) and democracy (de Tocqueville, 1835/2000) might be expected
to prefer peace. These range from moral considerations, such as reluctance
to spill blood except in self-defense, to the self-interest of politicians
and governments under democratic arrangements. Normatively, societies
that subject themselves to the rule of law are likely to extend the
same protection to foreigners as to their own citizens. The structure of
democracy may also impose restraints on democratic leaders; empirically,
leaders that lose wars are more likely to lose oﬃce in democracies than in
autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Whatever the reason,
it is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international
relations” that “liberal or democratic states do not ﬁght each other” (Levy,
1988: 662).
Given the close links between coercion and conﬂict, it is not surprising
that the toolkits that the economist applies to these two topics are largely
the same.
Rational Calculation
The single most important instrument that the economist brings to bear is
the idea of rational choice. Without it, social science is nothing more than a
psychological novel in which people are driven by inner forces they neither
understand nor control. Are people sometimes driven by inner forces they
neither understand nor control? Certainly. But there must be more to it
than this, or the practice of social science becomes impossible.
When choices are rational, that is, calculated, each person is thought
to weigh up the expected costs and beneﬁts to themselves of the possible
actions and to choose the one that oﬀers the greatest surplus (or the smallest
loss). As Clausewitz (1832/1982: 119) wrote:
“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means . . .War is not merely
a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”
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Consider the idea of optimization based on the computation of costs
and beneﬁts to oneself and the balancing of ﬁrst order conditions, and
call it “pure” rationality. Does that fully describe human nature as we
ﬁnd it expressed in empirical patterns of behaviour? Clearly not. It cannot
account, for example, for people who destroy themselves or the things and
people they love — at least, it cannot account for this in the form I have
stated it. But is it a useful starting point? Very much so, because, as I wrote
in another context (Harrison, 2005):
“If people do what they want, subject to the resource and information
constraints that we can identify and if we do not understand what they do,
then we are missing something important and we should not be satisﬁed to
throw up our hands.”
Consider a country threatened with overwhelming force. For the sake
of argument the country is Poland and the year is 1939. Hitler wishes to
acquire the Polish homeland and this is something that most Poles would
prefer to avoid. But avoidance is not on oﬀer, so their real choice is between
surrender and ﬁghting to defeat. Fighting is destructive and so must leave
everyone worse oﬀ than in the case of surrender. Thinking on lines of pure
rationality, a deal is available that would leave both sides better oﬀ than
if war broke out, so both sides should accept it. The Poles should agree
to give away the value of their homeland (which they will lose anyway),
and accept from Germany in compensation a proportion of what will be
saved by abstaining from resistance. For the Germans this should be an
acceptable deal, since they will gain Poland and the Poles’ compensation
will cost them less than they would have spent on violence.
For some, it is a problem that that’s not what happened. The crazy
Poles did not surrender, but fought until they were defeated. Our model of
pure rationality is a failure, apparently.
Actually, no. The model has told us that we are missing something,
and in that sense it is a success: it has extended our interface with the
unknown. When we see human agents doing something that is costly, the
principle of rationality tells us that they must expect to gain some future
beneﬁt (or avoid some future loss) that is equal or greater. If we missed it,
we need to work out what it was.
What were we missing? I’ll consider ﬁve diﬀerent ways of understanding
the rationality of Polish resistance to Germany in 1939. These are all factors
in the motivation of conﬂict that are important for economists — and
others — to understand, and at the bottom they all point in the same
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direction. These factors are entitlement, reputation, identity, uncertainty,
bounded rationality, and credibility. The ﬁrst four would not automatically
prevent coming to an agreement, although they would make coming to an
agreement or less likely, more diﬃcult, or more costly to Germany. The ﬁfth,
credibility, would seem to rule an agreement out, making war inevitable.4
Entitlement refers to the established fact that we value something more
when it is already ours — when we consider that it belongs to us by
right. This is one of the foundations of modern behavioural economics (e.g.
Kahnemann et al., 1991). This suggests a reason why the Poles were ready
to ﬁght: they considered Poland was theirs, and the value of resistance was
the defense of their entitlement.
Another factor can be reputation. According to the historian Anna
Cienciala (2011), Polish leaders of the time, such as foreign minister Jo´zef
Beck, put honor above the avoidance of conﬂict. If they had given away
what was theirs without a ﬁght, accepting a vassal state for Poland, they
would have lost their honor. In this view the value of resistance was the
safeguarding of their honor, even if they lost everything else.
The concept of identity ﬁlls a gap in economics (Akerlof and Kranton,
2000). Economists often describe economic behaviour as the rational pursuit
of self-interest. But who are we, and how can we deﬁne our self-interest
without ﬁrst establishing who we are? “I could not live with myself if
I did not . . .”: their own self-identiﬁcation is often a person’s most precious
possession, and occasionally one for which life itself must be sacriﬁced.
Thus, the paradox of behaviors that lead to self-destruction including
suicide, suicidal terrorism, and suicidal heroism, cannot be understood
except in terms of the self that such behaviours defend (Harrison, 2006).
If they had not fought for Poland, the Poles would not have been Poles.
Thus, the value of resistance was to safeguard a precious identity that would
otherwise have been destroyed.
Our analysis would be grossly incomplete if we did not take into
account that identity has many dimensions. The Poles were not just Poles.
They were also men, women, and children; elites and poor; Jews and
non-Jews; soldiers and civilians; religious and secular; nationalists and
4Fearon (1995) lays out further grounds that may prevent agreement and lead to
war within a rational-choice framework. Even when agreement is possible, each side still
wishes to secure the best agreement possible. To achieve this, the government may try to
exploit private information and strategic misrepresentation in such a way that agreement
is impeded. These do not seem applicable to Poland in 1939, but can still be relevant
elsewhere.
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internationalists; and so on. They surely did not weigh up everything the
same way. Poland was a young nation, and national entitlement, honor,
and identity are the currency of nation-building leaders. Honor was quite
possibly of more value to the elite than to the foot soldiers that were also
going to have to die for it. Disputes are more likely to be resolved through
violence when identities become polarized (Sen, 2006).
This reminds us, ﬁnally, that it is not nations that optimize, but
persons. Each person frames the choices of others; each person in the nation
must decide their own self-interest, given the choices that they expect others
to make. This interaction is something else that was missing from our ﬁrst
attempt at “pure” rationalism.
One factor in Polish resistance may have been uncertainty over future
costs and beneﬁts. Our model was framed by the assumption that if it came
to a conﬂict the Polish defeat was certain. In reality, war is a gamble: “No
plan of operations can look with certainty beyond the ﬁrst meeting with the
major forces of the enemy,” wrote the older Moltke (cited by Holborn, 1986:
289). Every Pole remembered the “miracle on the Vistula” of 1920, when
the Red Army’s apparently unstoppable advance on Warsaw was halted by
an unexpectedly successful Polish counter-attack. It is clear that Germany’s
Wehrmacht in 1939 was far more of an existential threat to Poland than
Soviet Russia’s Red Army in 1920. There was no room for Polish optimism
in any objective reading of the balance of forces. They were almost certainly
going to lose.
Our bounded rationality restricts our capacity to make the right
decision (for a recent summary, see Kahneman, 2011). The limits are
cognitive as well as computational. Among other things, we overvalue
small probabilities — for example, the chances of a second “miracle on the
Vistula” within two decades of the ﬁrst. Members of the Polish elite, with
shared experience of service in the dragoons, were likely to see a cavalry
charge as part of the solution to Poland’s problem, even if Poland’s problem
had no solution at all.
Finally, any deal that Germany could have put on the table would
not have been credible. In fact, the secrecy of Germany’s war preparations,
including the secret pact with Stalin that opened Hitler’s way into Poland,
shows that Hitler did not even try to oﬀer the Poles a deal that could
avoid war in 1939: Nor would the Poles have been wise to accept one if it
was oﬀered. Whatever agreement Hitler might have made before a Polish
surrender, he would surely not have kept his word afterwards. This was the
same Hitler that had recently swallowed Austria, the Czech Sudetenland,
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and Czechoslovakia itself. He had a clear record of making promises when it
suited him to do so and breaking them afterwards when it suited him. Any
deal that Hitler oﬀered to the Poles would not have been credible. They
would not have responded to the attempt, and he did not bother to try.
The model of rationality that we began with exempliﬁes the saying
of the statistician George Box et al. (1987: 74): “All models are wrong;
the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful.”
The idea of rational choice is wrong because it is oversimpliﬁed, but it is
not so wrong that it is useless. Used properly, it can still guide us to a
fuller understanding of the choices that people make, even in situations
characterized by ignorance, anxiety, and existential threat.
Strategic Interaction
Strategy has many meanings in the modern world, most of them only
distantly related to its roots. Strategy begins with prediction of the future,
and many public and private organizations claim to have “strategic plans”
that are really just aspirational descriptions of the state in which they would
like to be in a few years’ time. There, the word “strategic” is empty, because
any plan is about the future, and calling it strategic adds nothing.
The origin of the word “strategy” lies with generalship. The main task
of the general is to predict and counteract the action of some adversary
or rival. He must decide his best action (for example, to advance along a
given front), not knowing the enemy’s deployment but trying to predict it
based on the fact that the enemy is simultaneously trying to predict the
general’s line of advance in order to decide where to deploy his defenses.
“What does planning mean in war?” Answering his own question, Stalin’s
Marshal, Ivan Konev (1970) wrote, “We make plans alone but carry them
out, if one can put it so, in company with the enemy, that is, taking into
account his counteraction.” It is this simultaneity and mutual engagement
that captures the spirit of strategic interaction.
When we act strategically, we may or may not reveal our true
preferences, or we may even conceal them. We may line the streets to cheer
a hated tyrant. We may prefer peace but nonetheless plan for war.
Modern social science uses game theory to think about strategic
interaction. While many particular games are studied in the contexts of
conﬂict and coercion, one is canonical (Fearon, 1995). Suppose you have
a resource that I want, that you would not give me freely, but only if I
coerce you. In a dispute among states this resource might be your land; in
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Fig. 1. Conﬂict Over Resources.
a domestic setting it might be your labor. Set the value of this resource
equal to 1. We can resolve our conﬂict with or without violence. Violence
costs me ci and you cu (think of these costs as proportions of the value at
stake, which is the unit of account).5 Then the structure of payoﬀs might
look as in Figure 1.
The game played in the ﬁgure works like this. If I make my demand,
and you yield, the resource changes hands from you to me. If you resist
and I win, I gain the resource less the cost to me of violence; you lose the
resource and the cost to you of violence. If you win, nothing changes hands
and we both lose the costs of our own violence.
This game yields simple, intuitive results that also illustrate the
principle of strategic interaction. Should I make my demand? On the face of
it: Yes, if I expect you not to resist, or if I expect to gain from a ﬁght. Both
of these depend on the probability p of my winning if it comes to violence.
Find our expected payoﬀs from violence by applying p to my winning payoﬀ
and 1 − p to yours. Then, you will be willing to ﬁght me if you expect to
gain from it, i.e. 1 − p− cU > 0; otherwise, you will yield without a ﬁght.
I will be willing to ﬁght you if I expect to come out ahead from a conﬂict,
i.e. p−ci > 0. Unfortunately for the prospects of peaceful conﬂict resolution,
both of these conditions can hold at the same time; they require only that
the resource will not be completely consumed by the costs of violence, i.e.
ci + cu < 1. Violence can be avoided only if it is so costly in prospect that
a ﬁght would destroy everything.
5Other assumptions are that we are risk-neutral and we have common values
and full information, so there is no scope for the private information and strategic
misrepresentation issues discussed by Fearon (1995).
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Missing from this set-up is the option to bargain peacefully. That scope
for negotiation ought to exist is shown by the fact that beforehand the
value at stake is one unit whereas, after a value-destroying conﬂict, the
most there can be to distribute between us is 1− ci − cu. By agreement we
can save the value that otherwise would be destroyed (ci + cu) and share
this among ourselves. My outcome can then be better than p−ci and yours
can be better than 1− p− cu. As we have already discussed, however, the
likelihood of a bargain is dramatically reduced or eliminated altogether by
the problem that rulers who are willing to use violence to get their way,
whether domestically or internationally, may also be unable to commit to
agreements that avoid it.
This game is sometimes called divide-the-dollar (two players bid for a
dollar; if their bids sum to less than the dollar, they receive their bids, or
otherwise nothing). While international relations provide its usual setting,
the divide-the-dollar game can also be used to illustrate the outcomes of
domestic conﬂict under a coercive regime. The failure of Soviet economic
reforms provides an example. The “dollar” (or ruble) here is the additional
resources that would have been supplied if Soviet managers had honestly
reported their assets and capabilities to the government, if their workers
had given their working time fully to meeting management goals, and if the
government could have committed to reward the managers and workers in
return, in other words, to divide the ruble with them.
In 1929, Stalin began to transform the Soviet economy into a centralized
command system. By centralizing economic controls he was able to enforce
a near-complete monopoly of capital and a monopsony of wage labor and
farmers’ food surpluses. Between 1928 and 1940, increases in compulsory
work norms and production quotas and reductions in real wages brought
about a transfer of roughly 30 per cent of Soviet GNP (measured at factor
costs of 1937) from household consumption to other uses, particularly
investment and defense (Bergson 1961: 237).
In a market economy many workers would have responded to such
a squeeze by looking elsewhere. They would have been free to ﬁnd non-
government buyers for their products or services or in the last resort
to emigrate. Under communist rule these options were criminalized and
heavily punished. In the Soviet Union most workers were limited to “inside”
options which meant, for example, showing up to work but reducing eﬀort
and attention to quality. (Some important exceptions are the subject of
Chapters 7 and 8.).
There was a vicious circle, summed up in the Soviet-era joke: “We
pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” At intervals over the next
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half century, Soviet leaders made various eﬀorts to unlock this vicious circle.
The key, they believed, was to reward managers and workers for taking on
more ambitious norms and quotas. Among these eﬀorts, most prominent
were the rate-busters’ movement inspired in 1935 by the coal miner Aleksei
Stakhanov, and the postwar management and incentive reforms of 1965
sponsored by prime minister Aleksei Kosygin.
The problem was that government promises, to divide the ruble by
letting the workers keep the rewards for increased eﬀort, were not credible.
Enterprises that played the government’s game tended to be rewarded only
in the short term. Once they had revealed what they were truly capable
of, they had given away their main bargaining chip in negotiating the next
quota. In the longer term they were given higher norms and quotas, and so
lost their promised share of the ruble (Harrison, 2002).
In this sense (if no other) the structure of the problem that Soviet
workers faced with government promises in 1965 was identical to the one
that the Poles faced with Hitler’s demands in 1939: after implementing any
bargain, they could anticipate that the terms would be shifted against them,
and they would have given away their power to resist, so it was better not
to make any deal and slug it out. As a result the equilibrium outcome of
seeking to divide the ruble in the Soviet version of the game was low eﬀort,
low productivity, and endemic, unresolved conﬂict over norms and quotas.
In game theory terms the models shown here are highly simpliﬁed.6
They serve mainly to illustrate the structure of strategic interaction.
Although very simple, they have the virtue of suggesting how governments
and their adversaries had no choice but to put themselves in each other’s
shoes in order to identify their own best choices, whether the adversaries
were foreign leaders or their own subjects. This is the essence of strategic
interaction.
Increasing and Diminishing Returns
Strategic interaction has other features that make clear its aﬃnity to the
subject of coercion and conﬂict. One is the importance of activities in which
there are increasing returns at the margin. Most economic activities are
6In more advanced games we ﬁnd that players will behave diﬀerently given oppor-
tunities to throw dice, anticipate repetition, learn about each other, form beliefs, build
reputations, and purvey misinformation. For discussion of historical applications see
Greif (2006).
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characterized by diminishing marginal returns, and most economic models
assume it.
“Diminishing returns” sounds like a gloomy sort of thing, but in
practice it is what keeps society on the rails most of the time.7 I like a
glass of wine, but I enjoy the second glass less than the ﬁrst. As a result
I limit my consumption. Beyond a point, I stop. In other words, processes
characterized by diminishing returns tend to be self-limiting and arrive
sooner or later at a point of stability (which economists call equilibrium).
The same processes would become explosive in the presence of increasing
returns. If I enjoyed every glass more than the one before, I would quickly
drink myself into unconsciousness. At the same time, if I did not enjoy the
ﬁrst glass very much, I might never start. In other words, my life would
go to extremes: I would either be completely sober or there would be no
stopping me.
In conﬂict and coercion there are often increasing returns, although in a
sense that diﬀers a little from the example of my drinking habit. In this case
it is not my eﬀort that makes returns diminish or increase, but the eﬀorts
of others. Figure 2 has two panels. Panel (a) illustrates diminishing returns.
Fig. 2. Increasing and Diminishing Returns.
7David Hugh Jones highlighted this point for me in a blog post, “Very simple
thoughts about the politics of crisis” (7 April 2013), available at http://davidhughjones.
blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/very-simple-thoughts-about-politics-of.html (accessed 7 April
2013).
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Think of an industry that has a given market for its product. Working in
that industry has certain costs, which are also taken as given. When few
workers are engaged in the industry they command a high wage, so it is
proﬁtable for others to join them. Workers ﬂow into the industry, but this
also reduces the wage. Conversely, with too many workers engaged in the
industry the wage is driven below the cost of working in the industry, and
workers are driven out. Whichever side of the equilibrium point you begin
from, the process stops in the middle, where the number of people engaged
is such that the beneﬁt to the joining worker just matches the cost of doing
so. The result is a stable equilibrium. This is the normal world of everyday
production and trade.
Panel (b) illustrates increasing returns. This covers situations where the
private beneﬁt to a person of doing something increases with the number
of other people that are doing the same thing at the same time. Imagine a
war of attrition, in which two armies grind each other down. The battle is
won by the last man standing. In that battle, the more soldiers join in on
my side, the more likely I am to be that last man standing. But if you, the
soldier next to me, turn and run, that exposes me to the enemy and reduces
my chance of survival. As each additional soldier falls out of the ranks, they
reduce the beneﬁt to me of continuing to ﬁght. As I watch you, I ask myself
continually: Should I run too? If that calculation ripples along the line, the
army unravels suddenly into a ﬂeeing mob, and the battle is lost.
Under these circumstances war becomes a game of all or nothing: we
all join in together, or we all run for it. There is no balance between
the two.
A similar example works for political coercion. My block leader orders
me to fall into line with my neighbours and sing with them: “All hail
our glorious leader!” How should I respond? My ﬁrst response may not
be to question whether the leader is really glorious but to ﬁnd out what
others will do. If my neighbours are evenly divided, I might feel free to
go with my inner beliefs. If I hear they will all march and sing, my
private feelings about our leader may be overwhelmed by the likely cost
to me if I make a stand on my own and register dissent. If other people
show resistance, however, even if I am the biggest coward on the street,
I should bear in mind that it is also dangerous to be a hated tyrant’s last
supporter.
In other words, for anyone who is not an instinctive rebel, conforming
has returns that increase with the number of other people that conform.
The trick is to predict the standard to which one should conform. Hence
16 Mark Harrison
the common phenomenon of “weathervanes” — people whose professed
opinions follow the prevailing orthodoxy.
In the explosive world of increasing returns, there is no longer just
one equilibrium. Rather than getting slightly inebriated, I will either be
completely sober or unconscious. The army will either hold or collapse.
The regime will be stable until it falls suddenly; the crowd will be ﬁckle,
and everyone will be strongly “for” until they turn “against”. To make my
own best choices I must continually try to work out how everyone else will
behave, knowing incidentally that they are also trying to predict my own
behaviour, which is more or less the deﬁnition of strategic interaction. This
is, ﬁnally, a world of agonizing dilemmas: every day I must weigh integrity
against survival.
The role of increasing returns should not be overstated. In wartime,
many returns continue to diminish, and this accounts for important
regularities. The airplane was an invention of the twentieth century, and in
the 1930s most major powers gave a lot of resources to this new weapon.
But beyond a point they stopped, and also modernized their armies and
navies. This recognized diminishing returns to air power: sooner or later,
they got a point where they ﬁgured the military value of one more plane
would fall below the same value assigned to one more of the traditional
guns or ships. They also limited rearmament somewhere around the point
where the expected value of one more dollar given to the army fell below
the value of the same given to agriculture or public works. Even in total
war, this principle continued to apply: even when the threat was existential,
no country gave literally everything to the war.
The returns to coercion also diminish beyond a point. An extreme case
of coercion is provided by the residents of Stalin’s labor camps. Behind
the barbed wire of the Gulag, men and women were stripped of nearly all
possessions, nearly all family contact, and nearly all control over time and
movement. All their choices left them worse oﬀ. Yet, what did experience
show? You can put a man in these conditions, and point a gun at his
head, and it can still be hard to make him work. As Chapter 10 shows, the
expansion of the Gulag saw the evolution of ever more varied and complex
incentive schemes that were designed for no other purpose than to persuade
the slaves to work. The stick and the carrot were not alternatives. Even
when the main emphasis fell on the stick, Stalin still had to give out a few
carrots. In other words, there were limits to coercion. Not even a totalitarian
dictator could overcome diminishing returns.
Introduction 17
In short, both diminishing and increasing returns are essential instru-
ments in the toolkit that everyone needs to understand conﬂict and
coercion, and the problem is largely to understand which one to apply
in each context.
Scale and State Capacity
In conﬂict, scale might seem unambiguously good. Since Clausewitz,
modern strategists have thought of the ideal military campaign as the
application of overwhelming force to the enemy’s weak points. Sometimes
it worked quickly, sometimes not. When it dragged out, modern conﬂict
often became a war of attrition in which victory would be claimed by the
last man standing on the ﬁeld of battle. Whether warfare took the form
of a lightning blow or a bloody slog, why would less ever be worth more
than more?
In fact, the wars of the twentieth century have been historically
exceptional. If we go back through history it is relatively easy to ﬁnd battles
in which smaller armies were able to inﬂict overwhelming defeats on much
larger forces. At Marathon (490BC), a Greek army numbered in thousands
routed a Persian force of ﬁve to ten times the size. The Carthaginians
achieved a similar victory over Rome at Cannae (216BC). The English did
it to the French twice in a century at Cre´cy (1346) and Agincourt (1415).
In such cases, the smaller force defeated the larger one not so much
because of an advantage of equipment or terrain but by disrupting the
opposing force to a point where it suddenly changed state, from a proper
army to an uncoordinated rabble that could easily be slaughtered. At times,
it seems as though the smaller force was easier to hold together by ties of
discipline and comradeship than a larger force where each had a smaller
chance of a part in the ﬁghting and felt less commitment and obligation to
the cause of the whole.
Something that deﬁnes modern war, dating it from the time of
Napoleon, is the emergence of mass armies that could be held together
in defeat. Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, the Confederate retreat from
Gettysburg, the Japanese retreat to the home islands from South East
Asia and the South Paciﬁc, and the German retreat from Stalingrad and
the Caucasus, are all examples of vast bodies of men that somehow failed
to disintegrate despite pulverizing defeats that were piled one on top of
another for months and years.
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If every great army of the twentieth century had disintegrated on
suﬀering a great defeat, as the French army did in 1940, both world wars
would have been over within months. The fact that they often did not, but
were held together and retained their military capabilities, ensured that
modern war became a war of resources, in which those armies won that
could throw the greater number of men and munitions into battle and still
had men standing on the battleﬁeld when the battle was over.
In short, to have a war of resources, two great armies must meet, ﬁght,
and neither of them fall apart — something that seems to have happened
quite rarely before the twentieth century. The question that follows is: When
do armies fall apart, and when not? This is not an economic question, but
it is one that economists have considered. Brennan and Tullock (1982) cast
the soldier’s motivation in the framework of a prisoner’s dilemma: unless
some other factor enters the soldier’s calculation, whether his comrades
stand and ﬁght or turn and run, in the face of battle his best choice is
always to desert. Oﬃcers build comradeship and discipline to prevent this
from happening.
In history defeat has come most often, not at the point when all the
soldiers are killed, but at the point when discipline and mutual obligation
fail so that the army is suddenly pulled apart and is turned into a leaderless
rabble. Modern armies, however, have evolved into resilient networks based
on morale and commitment that can overcome the prisoner’s dilemma and
hold the ranks together even in quite extreme circumstances. When this
factor was equally present on both sides, improved leadership and morale
could no longer make the diﬀerence between victory and defeat. It was under
these conditions, and only then, that scale and resources could become the
decisive factor in two world wars.
Scale in modern warfare has implications for the state. To assemble an
army of modest size for a season, ﬁght a battle, and then disperse is one
thing. To keep a mass army supplied and moving from battle to battle in one
season after another is another. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, the demands
of twentieth century warfare have sometimes required the mobilization of
half or more of a country’s resources for years on end. To achieve this
required immense state capacity.
State capacity has many dimensions, ﬁnancial and administrative as
well as coercive (Besley and Persson, 2009). The raising of war loans
and taxes and the coordination and direction of human and physical
resources into the supply of modern wars produced a vast derived
demand for professional, non-corrupt administrative services. Autocracies
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of the pre-modern era had very limited capacity of this type. It was
the seventeenth century revolutions, guaranteeing private property and
constitutional rule in Northwestern Europe, that also gave unprecedented
power to government to tax and borrow in the event of war. In military and
naval power, the liberal democracies pulled ahead of their rivals, keeping
the advantage through World War I. As shown in Chapters 1–4, however,
by World War II some non-democracies had caught up and closed the gap,
exploiting modern nationalism and repression to mobilize resources with
still greater intensity, at least for short periods of time.
If pure scale has had the edge in modern warfare, does the same carry
over to the exercise of coercion? That is, is it better to be the tyrant
of a big country compared with a small one? To rule a large country is
certainly more complex, and complexity is costly. As ruler of the world’s
largest territory, Stalin had to commit major resources to the control of
the vast Soviet space and to border regions inhabited by ethnic minorities
from the Baltic to Mongolia and China. To ensure the implementation
of his orders, he had to rely on ever lengthening chains of command
and multiple, overlapping agencies of control (Markevich, 2011). Compare
Stalin’s problem with that of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Once a political
instructor of the KGB border troops, Lukashenka rose to become the
autocratic ruler of the former Soviet republic of Belarus. In Belarus, he
governs no more than three per cent of the population and one per cent
of the territory of the old Soviet Union. That is surely a simpler task than
Stalin’s.
Perhaps it is better to be a pike in a small pond than a minnow in a
lake. But it is better still to rule the lake. The reasons are things we have
already seen. First, dictators appear to have a propensity for war. Second,
in modern war, scale counts.
Surplus Extraction
The economic analysis of coercion and conﬂict encourages, in some ways,
a return to Marxian ideas about the economy. One of Marx’s (1867/1974:
173–182) central obsessions, was his idea of surplus value: the value that
a worker creates for the employer, above and beyond his own value (or
maintenance cost). This idea was so important to Marx because he regarded
all economies as, in essence, mechanisms whereby an elite, of one kind or
another, extracted a surplus from the working poor.
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Modern economics has abandoned this view as oversimpliﬁed to an
extreme. The model is not only wrong; it is not useful in most contexts.
In the Marxian perspective there is only one kind of surplus, called proﬁt,
one source of surplus, called labor, and one recipient, the capitalist class.
In the competitive market economy of today’s textbooks every transaction
gives rise to a surplus, and these accrue to the producers and consumers
that are party to every transaction. In other words, there are surpluses
everywhere and they accrue to everyone; they are not the monopoly of
one class.
At the same time, there are some economies that are undeniably
extractive. In these economies there is a restricted class of proprietor, or
perhaps a dictator, that controls production and distribution in a coercive
way, for its own exclusive beneﬁt. In extractive economies there is often no
clear distinction between politics and economics, because the security of the
proprietors rests on forcible restriction of the choices available to members
of the underclass, not on universal property rights and the rule of law. In
other words, the same people that want to monopolize the economy must
also monopolize the state.
Manorial economies, plantation and slave economies, and communist
command economies seem to ﬁt this template better than others. Inspired
by the example of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Manc¸ur Olson (1993) developed the
idea of a “proprietary dictator” that defeats rivals, monopolizes a territory
and extracts a surplus from it. Where competing predators would simply
ruin the territory, a monopolistic ruler would rationally seek to expand the
territory and even be willing to pay for public goods and infrastructure to
make it more productive, because this will raise the output of the territory
and so increase his revenues in the long run.
In this model economic development is not the dictator’s purpose, but
it is an incidental by-product of the dictator’s desire to increase the surplus
over time. As the example of the Soviet Union suggests, extractive regimes
have sometimes been associated with prolonged growth spurts, but they
have never given rise to the modern economic growth that persists unbroken
for a century. One important reason may be that the monopolization
of resources by an elite is antithetical to the “creative destruction” of
market competition (Ac¸emoglu and Robinson, 2012: 94). The analysis
of the downfall of the Soviet model in Chapters 11 and 12, strongly
suggests a link with its failure to respond to the opportunities presented by
new technologies and new industries that were spurring market-economy
development and globalization in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Marxists used to lay great emphasis on international movements of
economic surpluses. Economic historians somewhat lost interest in this
subject after it became clear that international trade before the nineteenth
century was simply not large enough to be a channel for signiﬁcant transfers
from one country to another (O’Brien, 1982).
Quantitative history suggests that this topic became much more
important in twentieth century conquest (Liberman, 1996). Germany’s
occupation of much of Europe in World War II arose out of long-term
plans for territorial expansion but the design of the occupation regime was
motivated more narrowly by plans to extract a surplus of food and resources
from the occupied countries by coercive means and transfer it to Germany or
the German Army. A new study by Klemann and Kudryashov (2012: 104)
estimates the actual contribution at around one third of Germany’s war
costs. (Further calculations would be required to estimate the additional
surplus extracted within Germany from the slave laborers imported from
occupied Europe).
The importance of the economic surplus for our subject goes beyond
its role in communist and fascist states. In total war, all economies
became extractive. Even in democracies, the elected government had to
ﬁnd resources for the army and its equipment. The resources had to come
from somewhere. Beyond a point, the working poor had to be squeezed
because they were the only class of society numerous enough to supply the
necessary resources.
In short, to understand what overlords and dictators maximize, and
how they maximize it, and to understand what all governments must
maximize in total war, Marx’s intuition remains useful. Although neither
of the authors is a Marxist, the surplus model that we apply to Soviet
labor coercion in Chapter 10 is consistent with a Marxian approach. To
repeat George Box, all models are wrong — and that certainly includes the
model that Marx developed. But wrong models can still yield insight, and
the Marxian model is one of these. It too has a place in the economist’s
toolkit.
Type I Errors
One way that social science advances is by formulating and testing
hypotheses against data. Evolution has programmed us all to formulate
hypothesis all the time, that is, to look for patterns around us and ﬁnd
signiﬁcance in chains of events. Our ability to do this has given us huge
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advantages as a species. Without it there would be no science, technology,
religion, or culture: we could not understand the universe, manipulate the
laws of physics, build social relationships, or peer into the future. Imposing
signiﬁcance upon chains of events so as to look into the future is something
from which an extraordinarily wide range of people can make a living
both for themselves and for others, for example politicians, priests, tipsters,
entrepreneurs, novelists, journalists, economists, and historians.8
Our propensity to discover patterns in what we observe is not only
creative. It is also a source of risk. The risk is realized when we make
mistakes. The mistakes we make can be of two kinds, which statisticians
call Type I and Type II. These concepts arise from statistics rather than
economics, but they are of fundamental importance to the economics of
coercion and conﬂict.
• An error of Type I is to see a pattern in the data where in reality there
is none. On a dark night you hear the footsteps of an attacker behind
you, but actually no one is there.
• An error of Type II is to miss a pattern in the data that is
actually present. Another night, an attacker comes behind you. You’re
distracted and unaware until it’s too late.
Which is worse? Both carry dangers. People that persistently make
errors of Type II can be described as complacent. They fail continually to
see the risks of terrorism and war and the environmental and health hazards
around the corner. As a result, bad things are allowed to happen before we
take action. Complacent people wake up in the end, only after they and
others have suﬀered signiﬁcant damage which, given better foresight, could
have been avoided. They lock the stable door after the horse has bolted.
Thus Type II errors can be corrected but correction is costly.
Type I errors are bad too. The people that persistently make errors
of Type I can be called paranoid. They see enemies and conspiracies
everywhere. The world is complicated; they think the world is a complicated
gun that someone, somewhere is pointing at them. They do not recognise
that many things are random; they will not accept that bad stuﬀ often
8Here I draw on material that I wrote for a blog post asking “How Can We Get to See
What’s Coming Round the Corner?” (August 6, 2009), available at http://blogs.warwick.
ac.uk/markharrison/entry/can we see/, and also (from the time before blogs) a short
unpublished paper, “The War Against Terrorism: Type I Versus Type II Errors”
(1 November 2001), available at http://warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/comment/.
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happens by accident or by mistake. Nor are they able to accept that a lot
of what happens is not really about them at all. Trying to forestall the bad
things they anticipate, people who are gripped by Type I errors are often
themselves responsible for doing things that are as bad or worse, such as
mobilizing society to solve problems that do not exist or attacking people
who are not enemies and would prefer to keep themselves to themselves.
Finally, there is a trade-oﬀ between the errors of Type I and Type II. If
we try harder to avoid one, other things being equal, we will inevitably end
up making more of the other. The only way to reduce both types of error at
the same time is to have more and better data. As long as data collection
is costly, we will never have complete information and we will always have
to balance one kind of error against the other.
Attitudes to the consequences of Type I and Type II errors have proved
to be important markers of social attitudes. Understanding the balance that
is struck between Type I and Type II errors can tell you a lot about the
nature of the society under study. In a court of law, the research hypothesis
is that the defendant is guilty. Let’s say the crime is a public order oﬀence.
Here the court can make two mistakes. It can convict the truly innocent
(a Type I error) or acquit the truly guilty (a Type II error). In most liberal
democracies, the courts are stacked against the prosecution, which must
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant incited a riot. In
other words, prioritizing the rights of the accused implies that we tolerate
Type II errors in order to avoid errors of Type I, which we see as particularly
costly.
In contrast the historical record of dictators is that, since they are not
particularly concerned about the rights of citizens but very concerned to
protect their own skins, they tend to operate criminal justice in a way that
scoops up and penalizes many fairly innocent people in order to ensure
that every guilty person is taken out of circulation. This has important
implications for the study of coercion. As discussed in Chapter 10, the
coercive regimes of the dictators that preside over extractive economies
typically accept large numbers of Type I errors as the price of avoiding the
Type II errors that might undermine their own security. In contrast, more
inclusive economies that respect the rights of individual citizens tend to
have arrangements, such as presuming innocence in the absence of proof of
guilt, that avoid Type I errors at the price of sometimes making Type II
errors.
The asymmetry in the consequences of Type I and Type II errors has
strongly aﬀected the research strategies of natural and social scientists.
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Most scientists would rather not be personally responsible for precipitate
action that wastes resources and destroys lives. Therefore, science is
cautious, and standard criteria for statistical signiﬁcance put much more
weight on avoiding Type I errors than avoiding Type II errors. So the data
support your hypothesis only weakly? Go back and get a bigger sample, or
let somebody else try; do not prematurely announce that you have identiﬁed
a cure for cancer or the root of some other evil.
Oddly enough, many historical commentators (including politicians,
pundits, and some historians) do not seem to feel this self-restraint. In fact,
the quality of historical writing is often judged by the ability of the historian
to weave a few random threads into an interesting pattern. Most readers
will be impressed by a story that is logical and is supported by some data,
even though the data points are selected and not at all representative.
In relation to our subject matter, wars are especially suited to biased
treatment because they comprise many great stories in which we can
identify directly with the actors and we are emotionally compelled by the
drama. The same is also true of the history of societies where there has
been victimization on a large scale. Every victim has a story to tell and a
need for acknowledgement.
Story-telling is powerful. Its intuitive appeal is much greater than
models, charts, and numbers. It speaks the language of nations and politics:
shared experiences, common destinies, collective rights and wrongs. It is
easily voiced by leaders and heard by followers untrained in statistical
thinking about trends and standard errors. As a result, while politicians
may turn to economists for technical advice, they get historians to help
write their speeches — Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (John F. Kennedy), Richard
Pipes (Ronald Reagan), and Norman Stone (Margaret Thatcher).
What makes the power of story-telling? First, story-telling is deliber-
ately selective. It does not try to be representative.When we scan history for
stories, we look by deﬁnition for sequences of events that have a beginning,
a middle, and an end. In the middle, something happens that is out of
the ordinary, dramatic, and unexpected. Invariably, we rule out all those
much more representative past circumstances out of which something might
have come, but after which there were no surprises and nothing much
happened.
Second, stories give us a way of thinking about how to handle rare and
unpredictable events. Houghton (1996), for example, has shown how U.S.
leaders used historical parallels to make decisions in the “novel emergency”
of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. In this sense, a well-chosen story (in other
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words, one data point) can meet the needs of decision makers in a much
more satisfying way than a statistician who just says: “Well, we need to
collect more data.”
Third, story-telling typically sounds an alarm. In history, dramatic
events are rarely good news. The good news in history has generally
been made up of the slow, steady progress of emancipation, literacy, and
prosperity. Such good news is easily illustrated by statistics and trends, but
does not make good stories. It is the bad news of tragedies and crises that
makes good stories.
In fact, an entirely legitimate purpose of a good story may sometimes
be to sound the alarm about the risks we face and so avert their realization.
George Orwell’s novel 1984, for example, warned western societies of the
dangers of totalitarian rule much more eﬀectively than a thousand learned
treatises on the subject.
There is a downside to this. Some stories can be self-fulﬁlling. There is
a particular kind of collective story, for example, that communal identity
politicians like to tell (Glaeser, 2005). These are stories of past hate
crimes allegedly committed by some other ethnic or religious group against
their own group: Black against White, Reds against Whites, Germans
against Jews, Jews against Palestinians, Protestants against Catholics,
Sunni against Shia — and, in all cases, vice versa. Such powerful stories can
be extrapolated into predictions of future hate crimes yet to be committed,
and then into justiﬁcations for hateful and violent action to preempt the
future crimes.
When we buy a story that is untrue or unrepresentative, we make a
Type I error. We accept as meaningful a coincidence between the pattern in
the story and a pattern inside our brains, despite the fact that the pattern is
not matched in the external world. For example, we may prefer some stories
to others, not because they are true, but because they are more comfortable
or more aﬃrming of our identity. One result is that the propensity to Type I
errors is strongly present in the history of conﬂict, where is where national
identities are made and aﬃrmed.
Consider the following popular hypotheses, which all relate to the
outcome of World War II:
• Britain won the war because the British way of life inspires loyalty.
• Germany (or Japan) almost won the war because Germans
(or Japanese) are disciplined and follow orders.
• France lost the war because French society was rotten.
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• Italy lost the war because Italians are cowards.
• America won the war because Americans are free and equal.
• The Soviet Union won the war because Russians love their country.
These ideas all carry a high risk of Type I error, as a moment’s reﬂection
will indicate. To explain the scope for error in each case: It is doubtful
that Britain could have won the war alone, in other words, without the
help of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Empire where
millions lived in ways that were quite diﬀerent from those of the British
at home. If Germany and Japan nearly won the war, it is likely that this
was because their leaders planned it that way and it took time for others
to rise to the challenge; strategy and timing were more important than the
innate characteristics of the citizens. If France lost the war, its society was
hardly more rotten than that of others. If Italy lost the war it was not
from cowardice; quite apart from anything else the courage of Italians who
resisted the dictator Mussolini must also have been a factor. If America won
the war, it was with the participation of large numbers of slave descendants
who were less free and less equal, and it was also with the help of the
Soviet Union whose citizens were ruled by a totalitarian dictator. Finally,
if the Soviet Union won the war it was despite the best eﬀorts of millions
of Russians who collaborated with the occupier or fought actively against
the Red Army.
In fact, Chapter 2 will show that in the twentieth century “our nation”
won wars most often by belonging to an alliance that was richer and larger
than the adversary’s alliance. This ﬁnding does not particularly help to
aﬃrm anyone’s national identity, nor does it contribute an exciting story.
Nonetheless it ﬁts most of the patterns in the data much better than any
hypothesis based on national exceptions or peculiarities.
A lesson is that the student of coercion and conﬂict needs to approach
all good stories equipped with a strong sense of scepticism. A deep
understanding and continuous awareness of the risks of the Type I error
is an essential element of the economist’s toolkit.
A Chapter-By-Chapter Summary
Table 1 sets out the basic tools used in this book, chapter by chapter. Not
every tool is used in every chapter. Notably, no chapter could have been
written without reference to the economist’s idea of rationality.
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Table 1. The Economist’s Toolkit, Chapter by Chapter.
The Economics of Global War
The book is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part is devoted to the
economics of global war. A common theme of the chapters in this part
of the book is the importance of scale, resources, and state capacity in the
outcomes of wars.
In Chapter 1, “War and Disintegration, 1914–1945”, Jari Eloranta and
I examine Europe in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. Globalization
came to an abrupt halt, replaced by protectionism, nationalism, war, and
killing and destruction on an immense scale. In mid-century, globalization
was resumed, and the European economies began to converge on much
higher and more uniform income levels. After two world wars, three things
had changed. First, European economic growth, integration, and prosperity
had lost its association with empire. No doubt to the surprise of Europe’s
nineteenth century leaders, had they lived to see it, it proved possible to
acquire wealth and wield inﬂuence without claiming imperial sway over
vast stretches of faraway peoples and their lands and oceans. Second,
Europe’s leaders had a new sense of the importance of cooperation. They
now cooperated with the United States in economic recovery, exchange rate
coordination, and tariﬀ reduction, with each other in laying new foundations
for European integration, and with developing countries in decolonization
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and development assistance. Third, Europe’s leaders had learned to use the
power of the state to regulate economic life. Learning the appropriate limits
of government control over the market economy in turn became a major
challenge of the postwar period.
In Chapter 2, “Why the Wealthy Won”, I look more closely at the
roots of victory and defeat in two world wars. The chapter starts from
the variation that we observe in the degrees of economic mobilization of
diﬀerent countries for total war in the twentieth century. Most of this
variation is explained by diﬀerences in the level of economic development
of each country, though not all of it and there some exceptions. There
are several good reasons that help to explain why mobilization capacity
should depend signiﬁcantly on economic development. The empirical
record is to some extent a puzzle since it seems to leave little room for
other factors that would feature prominently in narrative accounts, such
as national diﬀerences in war preparations, war leadership, or military
organization and morale. The chapter looks at ways of solving this
puzzle.
Chapter 3 asks “Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942?”
It appraises the economic dimensions of World War II both generally and
with speciﬁc reference to the eastern front. When the Soviet war eﬀort
is examined more closely, it becomes surprising that the Soviet economy
did not collapse in 1942. A rational-choice model is developed to illustrate
the economic conditions under which a wartime collapse of the economy is
rendered more and less likely. The possible eﬀects of policy interventions
by Stalin, Hitler, and Roosevelt on the stability of the Soviet war eﬀort are
deﬁned.
In Chapter 4, “The Frequency of Wars”, Nikolaus Wolf and I step
back from particular countries and conﬂicts to the puzzles that arise from a
quantitative overview of world history. Conﬂicts among states are, it seems,
increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870.
The main tradition of Western political and philosophical thought suggests
that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period
should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This
view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here,
we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing
number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread
of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number
of bilateral conﬂicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of
as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to
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go to war, conditional on the national capacity to do so. But the same
factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and so its
frequency. The chapter concludes that we need better understanding of
how to promote these goods without incurring adverse side-eﬀects on world
peace.9
Communism and Defense
The middle part of the book focuses on the relationship between commu-
nism and defense. In all countries where communists ruled, the mechanisms
of power were designed on a similar template of coercion and repression. The
two best accounts of this template are the sociological ﬁndings of Inkeles
and Bauer (1959) on the Soviet Union and Anne Applebaum’s (2012) new
history of the imposition of communist rule on Eastern Europe.
The more we know about communist rule from the inside, the more
important it seems to be that we understand how preparations for external
conﬂict were linked to coercion at home. A common theme of the chapters
in this part of the book is strategic interaction, conﬂict, and bargaining
over the surpluses that the communist rulers were willing to share with
the military and industrial interests that had the job of supplying defense
needs.
Chapter 5, “Soviet Industry and the Red Army under Stalin”, considers
some views of the Soviet “military-industrial complex” that are current in
the literature. The economic weight of the defense sector in the economic
system is summarized in various aspects. The lessons of archival research are
used as a basis for analysing the army–industry relationship under Stalin
as a prisoners’ dilemma in which, despite the potential gains from mutual
cooperation, each party faced a strong incentive to cheat on the other. The
chapter concludes that the idea of a Soviet military–industrial complex
is not strictly applicable to the Stalin period, but there may be greater
justiﬁcation for the Soviet Union after Stalin.
In Chapter 6, “Contracting for Quality under a Dictator”, Andrei
Markevich and I examine military procurement in the Soviet economy under
Stalin. This provides a novel historical context for a standard problem of
market organization, that of contracting for quality. The Soviet ministry
9This chapter came under critical ﬁre from leading political scientists. For their
criticisms and our replies, see Gleditsch and Pickering (2013) and Harrison and Wolf
(2013).
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of defense was engaged in the procurement of military goods from Soviet
industry. An internal market was formed and contracts were made. In
the market, the contractor had power over the buyer and typically used
this power to default on quality. In the background loomed a dictator,
imperfectly informed, but with the power to tear up any contract and
impose unlimited penalties on the contractor. The buyer’s counter-action
took the form of deploying agents through industry with the authority to
verify quality and reject substandard goods. The ﬁnal compromise restored
quality at the expense of quantity. Being illicit, it had to be hidden from
the dictator. Our case provides an historical illustration of the limits of
dictatorship.
Chapter 7, “A Soviet Quasi-Market for Inventions”, is also about the
allocation of resources in the Soviet economy under Stalin’s dictatorship.
In this chapter the resources were designated for military research and
development. The context was formed by the rapidly approaching limits
of an existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it with
another, and profound uncertainty as to how to do so. In the process we
observe the formation of an internal “market” in which rival designers
proposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. We observe
rivalry and rent seeking by agents, imperfectly regulated by principals. As
rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, the chapter shows, the
market was closed down and replaced by strict hierarchical allocation and
monitoring.
Chapter 8 examines “The Political Economy of a Soviet R&D Failure”,
the prewar attempt to create a new aeroengine technology based on the
steam turbine. From this example, we ﬁnd out more about the motivations,
strategies, and payoﬀs of principals and agents in the Soviet command
economy. Alternative approaches to the evaluation of R&D failure are
outlined. New archival documentation shows the scale and scope of the
Soviet R&D eﬀort in this ﬁeld. The allocation of R&D resources resulted
from agents’ horizontal interactions within a vertical command hierarchy.
Project funding was determined in a context of biased information, adverse
selection, and agents’ rent seeking. Funding was rationed across projects
and through time. Budget constraints on individual projects were softened
in the presence of sunk costs, but were hardened periodically. There is
no evidence that rents were intentionally distributed through the Soviet
military R&D system to win trust or reward loyalty; the termination of




Communist rule rested ultimately on command and coercion, and the third
part of the book focuses directly on this. Again, there is a lot about strategic
interaction between the state and the citizens, this time conceptualized
more broadly as producers and even consumers.
Chapter 9, “The Fundamental Problem of Command”, studies the
problems that arose under communist rule when the dictator gave an
order to an agent and advanced resources for its implementation. The
temptation was for the agent to shirk or steal from the principal rather
than comply; this constitutes the fundamental problem of command.
Historically, partially centralized command economies enforced compliance
in various ways, assisted by nesting the fundamental problem of exchange
within that of command. The Soviet economy provides some relevant data.
The Soviet command system combined several enforcement mechanisms
in an equilibrium that shifted as agents learned and each mechanism’s
comparative costs and beneﬁts changed. When the conditions for an
equilibrium disappeared, the system collapsed. An extractive state had
the task of aligning the incentives of its citizens to work together for the
surplus that the state required to ﬁnance its own goals. The citizens faced
continual temptations to shirk and steal. Keeping everything together was
at least a feasible problem in the age of mass production of things. With
the information revolution and the rise of the services economy this task
became more and more complex and ultimately, perhaps, infeasible.
In Chapter 10, “Accumulation and Labor Coercion”, Paul Gregory
and I examine how the level of coercion aﬀected Soviet wages and the
surplus available for investment under Stalin. From 1940 until the death
of Stalin, the conditions of Soviet labor were highly regimented under
draconian legislation which prescribed imprisonment and forced labor for
even minor violations. How successful was this experience? A successful use
of coercion implied that fewer resources would be needed for consumption,
without compromising the amount of eﬀort supplied by the workers. In
the desired outcome, accumulation would be enabled to grow. A major
issue was the problem of mistakes and unintended consequences of various
kinds. In the face of harsh punitive measures, Soviet workers shifted
eﬀort from production to mutual insurance through informal horizontal
and vertical networks. The Stalinist leaders often interpreted attempts to
protect subordinates as proof of conscious or unconscious betrayal of the
party and Stalin, which then became an occasion for new repression. In
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this atmosphere, the likelihood of errors in the allocation of both labor
and capital was only increased. In such conditions it is possible coercion
did not contribute to an increase in the level of accumulation. In fact, it is
quite likely that the Soviet economy’s accumulation capacity improved after
Stalin died and his successors reduced the level of violence in the economy.
Chapter 11, “Economic Information in the Life and Death of the
Soviet Command System”, shifts the focus to information problems under
communism. In market economies, information adds value to transactions
in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customization, and provides
yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not
produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or not, it
was often of poor quality; regardless of quality, it often suﬀered from low
credibility outside the ruling circle. In short, the Soviet command system
forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information
stock. This might help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth
and slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of
low output after the collapse.
Chapter 12, “Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet
Command Economy”, concludes the book. It addresses directly the problem
of how and why the Soviet economy collapsed in 1991. It begins by asking
whether command systems that rest on coercion are inherently unstable,
and whether the Soviet economy collapsed for this reason. The problem is
that, until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not look unstable. Why did
it then collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that
a high level of coercion may yield a stable high–output equilibrium, that
stability may rest in part on the dictator’s reputation, and that a collapse
may be brought about by adverse trends in the dictator’s regime costs and a
loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse
that was triggered by the Russian workers’ strike movement of 1989.
Conclusion
In this book, I apply the concepts and methods of analysis that I have
found most useful for study of the economics of coercion and conﬂict. The
economist’s toolkit is versatile, and can be applied to many problems that
are not economic at ﬁrst sight. Each of the tools is useful, provided it is
applied to the right context. The problem is to recognize the context and
select the right tool. If you want to ﬁx together two pieces of wood, there
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are times when nails will do the job and sometimes it requires screws.
Hammering a screw and trying to turn a nail will get you nowhere.
Sometimes the economist’s toolkit must fall short. Is economics ade-
quate by itself for a rounded understanding of everything that is wrapped up
in the subject of coercion and conﬂict? Clearly not. Power is about politics
before it is about economics. War is a political act. Force and violence are
the most multidisciplinary of human activities. They engage our emotions
as well as our reason. In my own work, whether I have acknowledged
it or not, I am sure that I have also borrowed many ideas drawn from
psychology, political and strategic studies, international relations, and
historical narrative. Nonetheless, any activity that involves the expenditure
of eﬀort for an expected return has an economic dimension, and that is the
justiﬁcation of the present book.
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